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Abstract: This paper builds on the growing literature that explores the relations between 
environmental change and non-traditional security, defined as non-military threats that 
challenge the survival and well-being of peoples and states. The Lake Chad basin in 
Africa is used as a case study for analysis. Focusing on a set of questions that has 
dominated recent theoretical debates, the paper investigates if conflicts resulting from 
water scarcity are as much about the broader vulnerability of the Lake Chad region as 
they are about changes in the Lake system and its environment. It argues that conflict is 
a probable outcome only in locations that are already challenged by a multitude of other 
context-specific factors beside resource scarcity. In the Lake Chad context, the 
likelihood of scarcity-driven conflict depends on whether vulnerability increases or 
decreases in the face of a declining water supply. The paper provides perspectives for a 
nuanced understanding of how the receding Lake Chad has led to conflict and outlines 
an integrated, forward-looking research agenda for linking environmental change, 
vulnerability and security issues in integrated human-environment systems.  
 
Key words: water conflict, water scarcity, environmental change, security, vulnerability, 
Lake Chad 
 
 2 
I Introduction 
Water ± its quantity, quality and distribution - has several potential consequences for 
human well-being in a way that its connection with security and conflict has become a 
subject of growing concern globally. With the redefinition of security in the early 1980s to 
reflect non-traditional threats such as cross-border environmental degradation and 
resource depletion, the types and sources of threats are now wide-ranging (Lowi, 1999). 
Much research focusing on the nexus between environmental change and security 
argue over whether environmental issues should be considered as a type or source of 
threat to security (Gleditsch, 1998; Hauge and Ellingsten, 1998). Some analysts claim 
that security has a militarised framework and including environmental issues as a 
security concern will be inappropriate strategically (Deudney, 1990). Others suggest that 
changes to the natural environment constitute a potential security threat because 
security is essentially about the well-being of people, which is influenced by the 
degradation of natural resources (Homer-Dixon, 1999; Le Billion, 2001). 
A key issue linked to this argument is assessed in this paper by examining how water 
factors into conflicts based on an understanding of the relationships between 
environmental change, vulnerability and security. There are few studies that specifically 
link environmental change, vulnerability issues and security in the field of water 
resources and water conflict (Goulden et al., 2008). Existing case studies concentrate 
on the Nile river basin and individual basins in the Middle East (e.g. Lowi, 1999). To 
date, case study analyses on the Lake Chad basin are sorely lacking and yet concerns 
about relationships between water and conflict in Lake Chad abound. The rate of 
hydrological changes in the basin is unprecedented. Between 1960 and 2000, the region 
where the lake is located experienced one of the most substantial and sustained 
reduction in rainfall events recorded anywhere in the world (IPCC, 2001). In 2003, the 
Lake region was classified among the ten most water impoverished locations in the 
world (UNEP, 2003). The impact of this on human systems has triggered large-scale 
social disruptions at various times in the past (Odada et al., 2006). While growing 
numbers of riparian agencies and policy makers have voiced concerns over the security 
implications of the receding lake (FAO, 2009), there is currently little effort to 
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systematically analyse and understand how and why the receding Lake Chad connects 
with regional insecurity. 
The aim of this paper is to provide a series of responses to a set of questions that often 
feature in debates in the environmental security research domain. The responses are 
framed specifically to reflect the challenges in Lake Chad. The questions are as follows: 
1. What factors are shaping the relationship between environmental change, 
vulnerability and security?  
2. Can understanding why and how people are vulnerable enhance understanding of the 
links between water and conflict?  
3. What institutional and policy responses are there to mitigate current and future 
regional insecurity?  
4. What further research is needed?  
Deepening water resource scarcity (i.e. less than 1000 m3 per capita availability of water 
resources per annum (Rijsberman, 2006)) in a setting where decline in water supply is 
leading to several conflict outcomes, challenges us to conceptualise security beyond the 
traditional notions of protection from the consequences of external military threats or 
internal manipulation of governance or political order. In this sense, security is perceived 
as a non-traditional threat (i.e. water scarcity or degradation) requiring non-military 
responses (i.e. evidence-based policies) to mitigate actions (i.e. conflicts) caused by 
HQYLURQPHQWDO FKDQJH 7KH WHUP µHQYLURQPHQWDO FKDQJH¶ KHUH UHIHUV WR WKH FRQWH[W-
specific case of the Lake Chad basin in terms of decline in water quantity and quality 
following the shrinkage of the Lake Chad. The paper holds the notion that both climate 
variability and human activities can induce environmental changes which can influence 
the foundations of livelihood subsistence by reducing access to, and the quality of, the 
natural resources that support human well-being. In this way, environmental changes 
can affect regional security. A concern with regional security relates security to the well-
being of individuals and communities in the four nations of Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon 
and Chad - which constitute the Lake Chad region. Regional security is conceptualised 
as a condition whereby the Lake region has the option to respond to natural resource 
scarcity based threats to its environmental and socio-economic well-being. We adopt the 
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notion of regional security (in which human security is embedded) in the context of 
threats to human capabilities and well-being (NNC, 2007). 
Though context-specific, this study offers detailed insights into the underlying 
complexities around how environmental changes and security connect in high risk 
UHJLRQV DV ZHOO DV DGYDQFLQJ XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI VRFLHW\¶V HIIRUWV WR UHGXFH LWV
vulnerability to those changes.   
 
II Engaging with the literature on water and conflict 
Fresh water has become an increasingly scarce resource in many parts of the world, 
particularly in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) where approximately one quarter of the 
population currently live in water-stressed villages and communities (Freitas, 2013).  
Because water is at the core of human existence, the literature about its connection with 
conflict is extensive. Major lines of research focus on scale dynamics by investigating 
water and conflict at trans-boundary/regional level (Wolf et al., 2003) and at local 
community level (Funder et al., 2012). Another line of research explores the 
mechanisms behind water scarcity and conflict interactions (Frijters and Leenstyaar, 
2003; Gehrig and Rogers, 2009). Other approaches focus on specific issues such as 
power relations (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006; Zeitoun and Allan, 2008; Stetter et al., 
2011), institutions (Tir and Stinnett, 2012), violent versus nonviolent water conflict 
(Bernauer and Siegfried, 2012) and water conflict management (Hensel et al., 2006). 
A range of debates exist which provides insight into the possible ways in which water 
can drive conflict or cooperation. One strand of the literature reflected in a seminal study 
conducted by Wolf et al. (2003) adduces that instances of cooperation over shared 
water resources outnumbered incidences of conflict. This finding reinforced an earlier 
observation by Postel and Wolf (2001) where they noted that riparian countries have 
long signed water-related treaties to reduce competing claims and to promote 
cooperation over a water resource, its allocation and uses. These scholars present 
water as an importanWUHVRXUFHWKDWIXQFWLRQVPRUHDVD³FRQQHFWRU´WKDQDVD³GLYLGHU´
and thus as a catalyst for unity and interdependence among people and nations. 
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A contrary view posits that given the increasingly scarce situation of fresh water, 
coupled with the lack of suitable substitute for most of its uses, a causal relationship 
exists between water scarcity and conflict. A large number of past and current studies 
promote this line of argument (e.g. Hauge and Ellingsen, 1998; Bernauer and Siegfried, 
2012; Kreamer, 2012). Using case studies from the Middle East, South Asia and South 
America, Remans (1995) suggests that competition over scarce fresh water leads to 
VHYHUHVRFLDODQGSROLWLFDOWHQVLRQV%XWWVQRWHGWKDWWKH(DUWK¶VKLVWRU\LVUHSOHWH
with examples of water-related violent conflicts. Eriksson et al. (2003) observed that 
between 1989 and 2003, 80 to 90 % of recorded armed conflicts have been internal 
(within nations). They identified water scarcity as one of the significant causes. It has 
been reported that on 37 occasions, in the second half of the 20th century, countries 
concerned about water (e.g. Israel and its neighbours - Jordan and Palestine) fired 
gunshots, burnt houses, blew up dams and undertook some form of water-related 
military and political actions (Gleick, 2008). An African example is the loss of over 250 
OLYHV GXULQJ D VHULHV RI ZDWHU FODVKHV LQ 5DEGRUH YLOODJH 6RPDOLD GXULQJ WKH UHJLRQ¶V
relentless 3-years drought, 2002 - 2005 (Wax and Thomason, 2006). 
From the vast water conflict literature, it is possible to find three key linkages between 
water and conflict. First, water conflict can materialise when tensions involve access to 
and allocation of water. Allocating water among different users and uses, even when 
water supplies are adequate (abundant), can be a cause of disputes. Similarly, a decline 
in water quality, which threatens human health, can be a source of potential disputes. 
Decline in water quantity or quality can trigger mass migration which could socially and 
politically destabilise destination states or cities (Carius et al., 2004). Second, the 
importance of water in sustaining livelihoods, mostly agricultural livelihoods, provides a 
link to conflict (Conca, 2006). Livelihood loss can lead to poverty, which is a traditional 
driver of conflict. Third, there are instances where power relations and inadequate water 
governance affect the potential for conflict, especially in settings where rivers flow 
across state boundaries and where institutions lack human, technical and administrative 
capacities (Gehrig and Rogers, 2009; Ludwig et al., 2011). 
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Although the world is yet to record any example of countries going to war over water 
(Wolf et al., 2003), the focus on cause-effect relations in this field has failed to frame 
water conflicts in a way that allows vulnerability  to explain why the same environmental 
issue produces different effects across a range of different social, economic and political 
settings. Vulnerability, as used in this study, means the characteristics of a region, state 
or people and the situations that define and influence their capacity to adjust to, resist 
and recover from the impacts of environmental change, such as climate change or water 
degradation (Wisner et al., 2004). Although vulnerability can have different definitions, it 
is usually approached from three key angles - exposure, sensitivity and adaptive 
capacity (Smit and Wandel, 2006; IPCC, 2007). Exposure is the presence of people, 
livelihood assets, environmental resources and infrastructure in locations that are 
predisposed to be adversely affected by an external shock or stress (IPCC-SREX, 
2012). Sensitivity is the degree of responsiveness to both problematic and beneficial 
stimuli resulting from environmental changes (Smit and Pilifosova, 2001).  Adaptive 
capacity is the ability of a system to adjust to internal or external changes, to moderate 
potential harms or take advantage of beneficial opportunities (IPCC, 2007).   
This paper recognises the limited attention given to vulnerability thinking in linking water 
problems to social conflict as a key gap in water conflict literature. It therefore seeks to 
move the literature forward by including notions of vulnerability, particularly by outlining 
the role of vulnerability in explaining water-to-conflict pathways, rather than the 
conventional notions of water scarcity or abundance. 
 
III Lake Chad and its environment 
Located in west-FHQWUDO$IULFD/DNH&KDG¶VG\QDPLFQDWXUHDVVHHQLQLWVVL]HVKDSH
and depth, is constantly changing in response to variations in temperatures and rainfall. 
A variety of ecological zones surround the Lake including deserts, forests, wetlands, 
savannas and mountains (Ovie and Emma, 2011). Three main drainage systems supply 
its water: the Chari-Logone River (in the Central African Republic), the Komadugu-Yobe 
River (in Nigeria) and the Yedsaram/Ngadda River (in Cameroon). Lake Chad was 
identified in a study conducted by Wolf et al., (2003) as one of the Lakes at greatest risk 
of socio-political stress. Over 7 years since this obVHUYDWLRQ WKH VWDWH RI WKH /DNH¶V
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basin has worsened as it has shrunk by over 90 % compared with its size (25, 000 km2) 
in the 1960s (Gao et al., 2011). Lake Chad was vastly bigger (up to 400,000 km2) 
several thousand years ago than it was in the 1960s, then it was known as Lake 
Megachad (Drake and Bristow, 2006). For the entire 20th century, the Lake was at its 
highest level between 1960 and 1963 (Figure 1). This informs why discussions about the 
/DNH¶VVKULQNLQJVWDWHRIWHQPDNHUHIHUHQFHWRWKLVSHULRG 
 
Figure 1: Historical variations of Lake Chad up to 2005 
(Sources: GIWA, 2004; US Geological Survey, 2014) 
 
Hydrological and biophysical changes resulting from natural climatic variability and 
various human activities threaten the entire Lake Chad basin, the Lake itself and the 
natural resources and ecosystem services used by communities to pursue their 
livelihoods (UNEP, 2004). The climate of Lake Chad basin is characterised by high 
temperatures, strong winds, high evapo-transpiration (estimated at 2,200 mm/annum) 
and fluctuating rainfall patterns (FAO, 2009). Annual rainfall varies spatially from nearly 
1,400 mm along the southern pools to less than 150 mm near the northern end (Odada 
et al., 2006). The history of drought in the basin is defined by its changing rainfall 
patterns. From the middle of the 1960s, rainfall started to drop intermittently until the 
droughts of 1972 - 1975 which coincided with the shrinking of the basin to 10,700 km2 
from its initial level of 25,000 km2 in 1963. Another drought of 1982 - 1985 resulted in a 
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drop in basin area to 1,410 km2 (GIWA, 2004), the lowest basin surface level recorded 
over the past 100 years.  
Stream flow modification and water diversion, associated with the construction of large 
irrigation and water development projects along the Chari-Logone River and Kamadugu-
Yobe River, are also identified as contributory factors in the shrinkage of the basin over 
the period 1970 - 2013 (US Geological Survey, 2014). The construction (between 1979 
and 1990) of Yaguou-Tekele Dyke and Maga Dam beside the Chari-Logone River in 
Chad, and a series of other dams, such as the Alau dam, Tiga dam, and the Yeders 
dam at the Nigerian end of the Kamadugu-Yobe River have impacted greatly on the 
/DNH¶VZDWHUV 2QXRKD%HWZHHQ and 1990, the average water discharge 
from the Chari-Logone River to the basin was 55 % of the average of the period 1950 - 
1970 (Olivry et al., 1996). It is estimated that about one-third of the water flow (since the 
1980s) is diverted from the Chari-Logone River in Central African Republic before it 
reaches the Lake Basin (Glantz, 2004). Water diversion for irrigation and hydropower 
generation increased greatly between 1981 and 1990 (GIWA, 2004). About 50 % of the 
GHSOHWLRQLQWKH/DNH¶VVL]HVLQFHWKHOate 1970s to 2000 was attributed to unsustainable 
water diversion and use for human activities (Coe and Foley, 2001). 
 
The current state of the Lake is one of acute water shortage. In 2000 water supply was 
less than 500 m3 per person per year (Henninger et al., 2000); this has not changed to 
date though population has continued to increase. A change from cultivation of low 
water intensity food crops (such as wheat) to high water intensity food crops (such as 
rice) has added to the water scarcity (Odada et al., 2006). Reduced water levels have 
caused increased alkalinity, increased anoxic conditions and worsened the effects of 
eutrophication (Ovie and Emma, 2011). Because the Lake region is generally and 
historically exposed to intense drought events, water scarcity is increasingly associated 
with the myriad of socioeconomic and livelihood shifts around the Lake, for which 
climate variability acts as an amplifier.  
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IV Method  
To provide a comprehensive answer to the questions posed in this paper, we undertake 
a qualitative historical analysis of water-related conflicts (also vulnerability and security) 
in Lake Chad. Our method is qualitative since the assessment of multi-scalar processes 
in linked water-to-conflict relations cannot coherently be undertaken through a 
TXDQWLWDWLYHDQDO\VLVRIFRUUHODWLRQVDQGRUUHJUHVVLRQVEHWZHHQVXSSRVHGO\µGHSHQGHQW¶
variable ± FRQIOLFW DQG µLQGHSHQGHQW¶ YDULDEOHV ± water scarcity and other location-
specific factors (Selby and Hoffmann, 2014). We focus on water conflict specifically 
because, of all environmental resources within the Lake, it is water which is most often 
OLQNHGWRFRQIOLFW:DWHUFRQIOLFWLVFRQFHSWXDOLVHGLQWKHZRUGVRI2(&'DV³DQ\
conflict arising between two or more parties holding competing claims over a water 
UHVRXUFH LWV DOORFDWLRQ RU LWV XVH´ ,Q WKLV VHQVH ZH HPSKDVLV WKH VSHFWUXP RI ZDWHU
conflict that stretches from non-violent expression of differences in opinion and value, 
through verbal assaults/heated arguments to deliberate contamination/pollution of water 
and  to outbreak of violence (open competition, riots and aggression) within a regional 
scale (Stetter et al., 2011).  
In order to unpack reported water conflict events in the region, we  reviewed several 
open access conflict datasets (specifically, the Uppsala Conflict Dataset of the Peace 
Research Institute Oslo, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project and the 
Social Conflict in Africa database). This review was complemented by water conflict and 
vulnerability narratives in peer-reviewed, Lake Chad-related literature, including official 
documents from the Lake Chad Basin Commission, Food and Agriculture Organisation 
and United Nations Environment Programme. Findings from key informant interviews 
were used to provide additional insights about the role of the shrinking Lake in conflict. 
Regional water conflicts ± which include intrastate (household, village and community 
levels), interstate, bilateral, multilateral, armed or non-armed, were identified to coincide 
more with specific drought events (and less with non-drought events) for the periods 
1970 to 2010. Our interest is to identify whether drought events, i.e. periods of water 
scarcity led to water conflict and how vulnerability is aiding it. Because the Lake region 
is historically prone to conflict, we recognise the likelihood of conflicts occurring during 
non-drought periods. However, since the paper is designed to better capture water 
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conflicts using evidences within drought years over the course of the shrinking Lake 
Chad, we do no focus on non-drought years. Thus, the study selected four periods/years 
during which the region witnessed severe droughts (i.e. 1972 ± 1975, 1982 ± 1985, 
1989 ± 1992 and 2002 ± 2005) and situated them within Lake Chad socio-economic and 
political context of vulnerability and regional insecurity. 
 
V Security and conflicts in Lake Chad 
While there is no anticipation of any future large-scale war over water, past studies 
reveal that increasing water scarcity can induce regional tension and conflicts, drive 
border disputes and can be the focus of political arguments, tribal violence and cross-
border terrorism (Kreamer, 2012). The security concern referred to in this paper implies 
security in the wider sense of threats to human capabilities and well-being, driven by 
environmental changes through water resource degradation and scarcity. Such threats 
could have implications for food supply, mass migration and regional cooperation and 
development. The Norwegian Nobel Committee conceptualised security in this wider 
sense during its announcement of the 2007 Peace Prize to the IPCC and Al Gore (NNC, 
2007). 
Much speculation about how water scarcity and the shrinking Lake Chad endanger 
regional security encompasses a variety of mechanisms. The importance of Lake Chad 
trans-boundary waters creates a situation where conditions in one country can create 
adverse repercussions in another. A river basin is a source of ecological 
interdependence under which water stress and conflicts in one country can be 
transmitted to another (Tir and Stinnett, 2012). With climate change causing reduced 
rainfall, reduced river runoff and more frequent droughts, the extent and impacts of 
water scarcity are far reaching, particularly in the context of livelihood security. 
A synthesis of various documented reports on Lake Chad (Figure 2) shows that there 
were increased water crises in the region during the droughts of the 1980s and 1990s. 
This period witnessed several militarised conflicts over competing river claims, 
especially as resource users migrated in response to the shrinking Lake. For example, 
between 1980 and 1994, almost 60,000 Nigerians followed the receding Lake waters; 
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ILVKLQJ FXOWLYDWLQJ FURSV DQG UHDULQJ DQLPDOV ZLWKLQ &DPHURRQ¶V ERUGHU RI WKH /DNH
Basin (Hall, 2009). As communities and individuals in the receiving cities and states 
could not engage diplomatic options to resolve conflicts, several people lost their lives. 
By triggering hostilities with neighbours or damaging relationships between and among 
nations sharinJ WKH /DNH¶V FRPPRQ SRRO UHVRXUFHV WKH VKULQNLQJ /DNH WKUHDWHQV
regional security.  
As Figure 2 indicates, between 1982 and 1985 interstate water and boundary conflicts 
increased among the riparian nations (Wallensteen and Margareta,1999; Odada et al., 
2006; UCDP, 2008). In 1982 local people from Cameroon and Nigeria clashed over 
access to the water resources around the south end border of the Lake Basin (Odada et 
al., 2006).  In 1983, Chad engaged in an interstate violent conflict with Nigeria over the 
status of the islands in the Lake to which both countries have borders (UCDP, 2008). 
This violence resulted in over 100 casualties (Wallensteen and Margareta, 1999). In the 
late 1980s, Nigeria and Niger Republic clashed over water diversion and access to the 
Komadugu-Yobe River flow within the Lake Basin. In 1992 there were clashes between 
upstream (Nigeria) and downstream (Niger) communities over access to the waters from 
the Tiga and Challawa Gorge dams at the south-west end of Lake Chad (Odada et al., 
2006).  
Since 2005, competitions and conflicts over the use of resources within the Lake have 
FRQWLQXHG WR FUHDWH VHFXULW\ FRQFHUQ DW WKH /DNH¶V VRXWKHUQ SRRO ZKHUH WKH ODUJHVW
population of resource users live (GIWA, 2004). Water shortages and loss of livelihood 
options have driven vulnerable people into risky behaviours such as drug trafficking and 
trading of arms. Ohlsson (2003) argued that large cohorts of young people deprived of 
their sources of livelihoods constitute the major share of terrorist groups/rebels in third 
world militias. The rising of violent jihadist militants which has killed over 10,000 people 
in the southern portion of the Lake, has been linked to loss of livelihoods and 
joblessness created by environmental degradation around the Lake (Ifabiyi, 2013). 
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Figure 2. Synthesis of major droughts and water conflict events (1UCDP, 2008; 2International Crisis Behaviour Project Database; 
3Odada et al., 2006; 4Hall, 2009; 5Lane, 2004; 6GIWA, 2004; 7Social Conflict in Africa Database). Here vulnerability is captured in the 
notion of the context-specific nature of the Lake area as seen in increasing migration, political unrest, poverty, social instability, 
ethnic differences and historical conflict events 
 
As water scarcity and poverty become more amplified and intense, the economic and 
political value that communities and nations place on the Lake resources will increase. 
Growth in unilateral consumption and unregulated allocation and use of water (e.g. 
through damming, diverting, dumping and draining activities) by one nation will decrease 
the amount available to another state. In the wake of the droughts and water shortages 
of the 1980s, each riparian country unilaterally took decisions to construct dams and 
divert water away from the Lake without recourse to existing water agreements and 
consultations with the LCBC (Onuoha, 2008). This implies that previously agreed river 
diversion arrangements (e.g. for agriculture, human consumption and industrial use) are 
becoming politically problematic as rivers flowing into the basin continue to drop and as 
the resulting externalities become a burden for downstream countries (Odada et al., 
2006). 
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VI Environmental change, vulnerability and (in)security 
One of the significant pathways by which environmental change influences security and 
LQGXFHVRFLDOWHQVLRQVDQGFRQIOLFWVLVWKURXJKLWVLPSDFWRQZDWHUVFDUFLW\DQGSHRSOH¶V
vulnerabilities or adaptive capacities (Ludwig et al., 2011). There is now a substantial 
body of literature that focuses on the various determinants or drivers of vulnerability 
(Kelly and Adger, 2000), how systems differ in their vulnerabilities (Ford and Smit, 2004; 
Adger, 2006) and what vulnerability issues to focus on when conducting vulnerability 
assessments (Smit and Wandel, 2006). Whilst this literature offers useful directions on 
the different ways vulnerability can be approached, it is yet to expand to high risk, 
conflict-prone settings where research is able to link vulnerability issues with conflict to 
explain how vulnerability feeds into water and conflict interactions (Ludwig et al., 2011). 
Further, within the regional security context for river basins, an in-depth investigation of 
conflict-oriented vulnerability to water scarcity or degradation is needed to improve our 
understanding of how vulnerability to resource scarcity makes certain locations 
susceptible to insecurity.   
We argue, as have others, that vulnerability to water scarcity can widen, rather than 
close, the water-to-conflict pathways, particularly in a region where sources of income 
and subsistence are declining and where people and societies lack capacities to adapt 
(Adger, 2006; Wisner, 2009; Fraser et al., 2011). Embedding the notion of vulnerability 
in environmental security assessments provides a holistic insight into the multifaceted, 
interlinked variables in resource conflicts identified in Peluso and Watt (2001).  This 
insight emphasises that every state globally has its own specific vulnerability signature 
ZKLFK GHILQHV WKH µQDWXUH RI WKH VWDWH¶ 5DOHLJK et al., 2014), and on this basis, an 
argument can be processed on why the same environmental condition can create a 
range of different effects in different locations (spatial variation) and at different periods 
or seasons (temporal variation). In practical terms, what vulnerability thinking does is to 
point attention  to why emphasis on resource scarcity or abundance is not a necessary 
or sufficient reason for conflict outbreaks (Le Billion, 2001) and why perspectives solely 
based on environmental determinism can lead to inferior policy suggestions. Situating 
water conflict within the context of location-specific vulnerability, where emphasis is on 
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KRZSHRSOH¶VYXOQHUDELOLW\XQGHUHQYLURQPHQWDOFKDQJH OHDGV WRFRQIOLFWKDV WKHUHIRUH
become a critical next step research focus in this field. 
Lake Chad and its riparian communities provide a breadth of conditions in support of this 
argument. The Lake region is highly vulnerable to many domestic and external shocks 
and stresses (Ovie and Emma, 2011). This vulnerability is driven by factors which touch 
on the exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity of the region. An assessment of the 
vast body of literature that focused on the problems of Lake Chad identifies the drivers 
as climate change-induced water scarcity, high SRSXODWLRQGHQVLW\SHUVRQP2), low 
per FDSLWD *'3  86 per person per year), poor/unfriendly relations, politically 
active minority ethnic groups, large dams and other water development projects and an 
absence of water allocation laws and treaties (Odada, et al., 2006). These factors agree 
with the issues Yoff et al. (2003) identified as key drivers that predispose a lake or river 
basin to water insecurity. 
To allow for a closer assessment, we have grouped these into climate, population 
dynamics and socio-economic-political conditions (Odada et al., 2006). These factors 
cut across the entire Sahel, a region that is highly exposed and sensitive to harsh 
climatic conditions, and characterised by over-exploitation of natural resources, poor 
infrastructure, widespread poverty, high illiteracy rates, social conflicts, poor health care 
and high dependence on climate-sensitive livelihoods (Benjaminsen, 2012). 
Climate 
This paper posits that the significant driver of environmental impacts on Lake Chad 
remains climatic variability and change. These influence the Lake on many fronts ± by 
reducing the river flows that feed it, by driving the evaporation of its water and by 
inducing water quality changes through heavy precipitation of chemical elements (Ovie 
and Emma, 2011). The climate of Lake Chad has been clearly highlighted earlier (see 
Section 3) but it is relevant to emphasise that while climate drives water quantity 
(supply) and distribution, population dynamics and socio-economic conditions (such as 
institutional development, water legislations and economic growth) are the principal 
factors affecting quality and demand (UNEP, 2005). Where renewable water resources 
are less than 1000 m3/person/annum, water availability is considered to create a 
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condition of discontent and desperation, especially when socio-economic development 
is constrained as a result (Gleick, 2008).  
Population dynamics 
The human population dynamics around Lake Chad are driven by a southward migration 
trend following the collapse of the /DNH¶VQRUWKHUQSRROLQWKHVDQGV*,:$
 7KLV WUHQG KDV FKDQJHG WKH /DNH¶V GHPRJUDSKLF VWUXFWXUH DQG FUHDWHG QHZ
production and development concerns. The population of the region is well over 30 
million, growing at the rate of between 2.5 and 3.0 % annually (Hall, 2009). There are 
over 70 ethnic groups around the Lake (Bene et al. 2003; Ovie and Emma, 2011), each 
exploiting the natural environment through a range of diverse activities. The dominant 
groups are the Hausa, Fulani and Kanuri groups along the western shores of the Lake 
(Nigeria), the Mousgoun in Yaere (Cameroon) and the Sara and Kotoko in the Chari 
Delta (Chad). This population is predominantly rural, thriving on climate-sensitive 
agriculture-related activities.  
Research has shown that rapid population growth under changing environmental 
conditions makes resource users insecure and vulnerable to violence (GIWA, 2004). For 
Lake Chad, vulnerability is shaped by a growing population that is pursuing similar 
resources at the same time; resources that are limited in their supply (Onuoha, 2008;  
Hall, 2009). The role played by ethnic heterogeneity in local resource conflicts in this 
region contributes to its population dynamics. Ethnic composition remains a crucial 
factor for mobilisation and turning protest into collective violence through the use of 
language and religion. In trying to make a living through exploitation of water and land 
resources, the multi-ethnic groups have often engaged in inter-ethnic and sectorial 
conflicts (Le Barbe and Lebel, 1997). One particular instance is the recurrent clashes 
between the Shuwa Arabs from the east (of Lake Chad) and the Fulani pastoralists from 
the south west over the limited fishing and animal husbandry opportunities at the 
southern pool of the basin (Odada et al., 2006). 
Socioeconomic and political conditions 
Socioeconomic conditions in this environment cut across a range of challenging issues. 
The riparian countries are characterised by slow and unstable economic systems. 
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Poverty is acute aQG ZLGHVSUHDG ,Q WKH  8QLWHG 1DWLRQ¶V +XPDQ 'HYHORSPHQW
report, Niger was ranked 186, Chad 184, Nigeria 153 and Cameroon 150 out of 186 
countries globally (UNDP, 2013). These countries face very low labour productivity, 
absence of a dynamic private sector, an oversized informal sector and inadequate 
infrastructure (GIWA, 2004). Series of civil wars coupled with increases in military 
expenditures has further retarded economic progress, particularly in Chad and Niger 
(Hall, 2009). 
The receding of the Lake has contributed to the dwindling fortune of the region. Before 
the current state, the Lake waters supported massive agricultural production: fishing, 
animal husbandry and growing of food crops (such as cotton, groundnut, cassava, 
millet, onions, rice, maize and sorghum) - which in turn supported the economy of the 
region (Odada et al., 2006). Since the droughts of the 1970s and 1980s, agricultural 
production has continued to decline. For example, annual sorghum yield was less than 
250,000 tonnes during the 1972-1975 droughts and 180,000 tonnes during the 1982-
1985 (GIWA, 2004). This has further declined to date (US Geological Survey, 2014). 
Water shortages have initiated shifts in livelihood patterns. As the amount of grazing 
land for animals has decreased, herders in several locations have shifted from rearing 
grazing animals (cattle and camel) to browsing animals (sheep and goat) (Onuoha, 
2008). This practice has led to increased removal of vegetation cover (US Geological 
Survey, 2014). In addition, with a declining annual fish catch (for example, annual fish 
FDWFK IURP WKH /DNH¶V ILVKHULHV GHFUHDVHG IURP  WRQQHV LQ WKH HDUO\ V WR
70,000 tonnes in 2002 (Living Waters, 2003)), fishers engaged in small-scale open 
water fishery have had to switch to swamp and floodplain fisheries. This required a 
change in fishing gear, from open water gear to specialised passive gears such as gill 
nets, cane traps and hooks. Because of reduced fishing areas, large-scale fishers have 
had to invest in bigger and safer boats to enable them migrate longer distances to 
access open waters of the Lake to catch species of higher value. Only the wealthy 
fishing households are able to make these adjustments (Ovie and Emma, 2011). 
A combination of these varied economic conditions has affected the social and political 
space in the region which further creates severe implications for the riparian livelihoods. 
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Diminishing river flow has influenced inland transport (Ngatcha, 2009), cutting off trade 
links, creating hostile neighbours and slowing down economic growth (Neiland and 
Bene, 2003). The population lacks education, face limited employment opportunities, 
live under extreme weather conditions, exploit the environment in an unsustainable way, 
face food/nutrition insecurity, prone to numerous health challenges and lack access to 
credit facilities and adequate health care. Prevailing political instability and poverty 
inhibit the capacity of communities to initiate and implement viable adaptive strategies. 
Lack of effective institutions, poor information network and absence of welfare support 
systems add to the burden in the area (Odada et al., 2006). All these combine to explain 
why and how the people are vulnerable and consequently can enhance knowledge of 
the link between environmental change and conflict. 
Synthesis: are environmental change, vulnerability and security issues linked? 
Environmental change, vulnerability and security issues appear to be linked in this case 
VWXG\&KDQJHVLQWKH/DNH¶VHQYLURQPHQWFRXSOHGZLWKWKHYXlnerability of the peoples 
and states have always been part of the security debates. While environmental change, 
as seen in climate-induce water scarcity and droughts for Lake Chad, does not 
constitute a sufficient cause of insecurity, how this change combines with the Lake Chad 
context-specific factors (climate, population, socio-economic and political factors) to 
either increase or decrease vulnerability provides a necessary condition for conflict to 
evolve and thrive. A shift in environmental conditions, either due to climate change or 
human activities, creates a lot of challenges for household and livelihood systems. A 
number of studies have indicated that in conflict settings, environmental factors tend to 
function more as triggers or intervening variables (Lowi, 1999). For example, excessive 
flooding and prolonged droughts at certain times of the year in Lake Chad often combine 
to weaken communities that lack external supports and burdened by corrupt, insensitive 
leaders. However, it is possible to find situations in a developing world setting where 
environmental factors tend to go beyond just being the intervening variables to being 
part of the context of conflict. This can be the case where livelihood subsistence is 
heavily linked to the natural resource base.  
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We argue therefore that because the environment in Lake Chad is already vulnerable to 
a number of external shocks, this vulnerability adds up or combines with the vulnerability 
of the region in terms of its households and livelihoods, to create pathways leading to 
insecurity. This suggests that the linkage is more about the broader contextual 
vulnerability of the region, which has been on the increase as climate becomes more 
chaotic and as a multitude of other context-specific factors threatens the survival and 
well-being of humans in the area (Figure 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: A linked environment-vulnerability-conflict nexus for Lake Chad 
This synthesis posits that environmental and security concerns may be secondary to 
vulnerability concerns in a developing world context such as the Lake Chad region, 
because it is on the basis of vulnerability dynamics that we can better understand why 
locations facing the same environmental conditions are impacted differently. Much as 
the factors driving vulnerability in Lake Chad have been identified (earlier in this 
section), they combine to shape the link between environmental change(s), vulnerability 
and insecurity. Insight from this region supports conclusions from previous studies (e.g. 
Hauge and Ellingsen, 1998; Homer-Dixon, 1999; Ludwig et al., 2011; UNEP, 2005) that 
the environment is connected to human well-being; that livelihood opportunities are 
linked to a stable environment; and that all of these are connected in one way or another 
to security. However, it is the presence of severe demographic factors, weak justice and 
poor resource governance mechanisms and arrangements for establishing rights of 
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resource access and use that differentiate locations facing similar environmental 
challenge in terms of whether conflict happens or not. These factors are within the 
purview of vulnerability issues and support the notion that efforts to unpack regional 
vulnerability issues can be a critical first step towards addressing environmental and 
security challenges.  
 
VII Pathways towards cooperation and human well-being 
Enabling vulnerability assessment in the context of environmental change and conflict 
analysis can inform various institutional and policy interventions targeting social stability 
and peace building. Current military strategies by the riparian countries to contain 
insecurity in Lake Chad do not touch on the root causes of conflict, particularly the 
drivers of vulnerability. Non-military strategies such as the proposed water transfer from 
Congo River basin via the Ubangi River to recharge the Lake waters might increase 
livelihood opportunities if successfully implemented (LCBC, 2012). However, under 
weak institutional arrangements for efficient water allocation and use, rapid population 
growth and mass migration means that demand for water will increase and might further 
create conditions where vulnerability would encourage a closer linkage between 
environmental change and insecurity.   
 
A key pathway to peace and human well-being therefore will be to reduce vulnerability in 
WKH UHJLRQ DQG HQKDQFH SHRSOH¶V UHVLOLHQFH ZLWK RU ZLWKRXW WKH /DNH ZDWHUV &RQIOLFWV
can be prevented by increasing the capacity of the people to both adapt and diversify 
beyond the current total reliance on environmental resources. To progress, states and 
communities must find ways to manage population growth, address migration, prevent 
unsustainable environmental practices (e.g. overgrazing and over fishing) and conserve 
and distribute resources in a manner that support human welfare. A robust water charter 
WKDWSURPRWHVHTXLW\DQG MXVWLFHVKRXOGIRUPSDUWRI WKHSROLF\GULYH WRFUHDWH µIULHQGO\¶
neighbourhood relations in the region. 
The Lake Chad Basin Commission has the responsibility to work with stakeholders 
across the region to address sharing, conservation and management of the Lake 
resources and in engaging diplomatic options to resolve conflicts. Water may be scarce, 
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but capacities to mitigate environmental constraints are not. However, for a variety of 
reasons ranging from insensitive, predatory governing structures to political conflict to 
terrorism to weak institutions, problem-solving scientific capacities have not yet been 
effectively mobilised to advance cooperation and security of peoples and communities. 
Enhancing the capacity of the region awaits the right socio-economic and political 
context. If the creative capacities of local people are enhanced and efforts are made to 
develop the conditions that allow those capacities to be mobilised and deployed, then 
human welfare can be improved and future insecurity can be prevented. Institutional and 
policy inputs are required to create and sustain the pathways towards security. 
 
VIII Conclusion 
The limited attention given to vulnerability thinking in several attempts to link 
environmental issues to security can influence how we understand the interactions 
between water problems and social conflict. In this paper, we argue that vulnerability 
perspectives can offer an important lens for assessing the complex interactions between 
environmental issues and security. Drawing upon evidence in Lake Chad, we 
demonstrate that the explanations for conflicts about water lie not only with the natural 
environment or changes to it, but also with the underlying vulnerabilities that 
characterise the region. The notion of vulnerability used in this paper addresses more 
searchingly the issues of climate change, population growth and socio-economic-
political deprivations. These are challenging issues intellectually. Their influence in 
shaping the environment-vulnerability-security nexus can be holistically unpacked by 
engaging more with locally-embedded, place-based contexts. Around these three 
issues, we find reasons why locations facing the same environmental conditions can 
have different water-to-conflict pathways.  
 
Although a vulnerability perspective can represent a useful point of entry into 
environmental change and conflict assessments, the paper suggests that it will be totally 
PLVJXLGHG WR IRFXV DWWHQWLRQ RQ UHGXFLQJ SHRSOH¶V YXOQHUDELOLW\ RU Dddressing water 
scarcities alone, either in an effort to reduce or resolve regional insecurity. Focusing on 
all components and linkages from environmental conditions to conflict is critically 
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important. This again is where vulnerability assessment can be very useful particularly in 
terms of identifying linkages of broad relevance.  
 
Further research, therefore, needs to focus more on why and how the various 
connecting variables or components emerge, and how they thrive and combine to create 
potential avenues for conflict. The composition of institutions and how they relate with 
external shocks on the environment need to be examined to advance the capacity of 
institutions to create and sustain pathways towards the well-being of the region. On 
these bases, scholars can better construct useful arguments to advance the need for 
non-military engagements towards regional cooperation and human well-being.  
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